

Xen Project Contributor Training

Part 4 : Culture

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Content

Theory: Open Source Flywheel

The demands on what vendors and users want from Xen Project is changing using the Flywheel to illustrate

The project has a recent history of change

Example: The history of the Security Vulnerability Management Process

Other examples of recent and ongoing changes

New demands on the project: New Features/Community Growth vs. Review Process and Review Capacity

New demands on the project: New Features/Community Growth vs. Quality and Security

Feature Lifecycle Management and Documentation



Theory:

Open Source Flywheel

Users

Feedback, Engagement
Trust, Passion, Media
Coverage

Open Source Development Model

Tools, Process, Culture
Option Value^[1], Modularity

[1] bit.do/optionvalue



Product and Experience

Features, Quality
3rd Party Integrations

Development Activity


Contributions, Reviews,
Problem Solving, Leadership

Users

**Open Source
Development Model**

**Product and
Experience**

Development Activity



**More
Users**

*More business opportunities
and momentum*

**Open Source
Development Model**

**Community
Growth**

**Better
Product and
Experience**

*Lower deployment
cost and risk*

**More
Development Activity**

Lower development cost



**More
Users**

*More business opportunities
and momentum*

**Open Source
Development Model**

**Community
Growth**

**Better
Product and
Experience**

*Lower deployment
cost and risk*

**More
Development Activity**

Lower development cost



**More
Users**

*More business opportunities
and momentum*

**Better
Open Source
Development Model**

*More efficiency and
innovation*

**Community
Growth**

**Better
Product and
Experience**

*Lower deployment
cost and risk*

**More
Development Activity**

Lower development cost





War Stories:

Tragedy of the Commons (sort of)






So what happened and why?

OpenSSL Stats

Lines of Code




Prior to Heartbleed

Growing Codebase


Static and small contributor base
1 person maintaining 100 KLoC =
Underinvestment


Extremely large user base
Critical infrastructure component
Thus impact of Heartbleed is huge

Contributors per Month



**Large user base did not translate into
developer community growth**





Lesson for Xen Project

**Stay vigilant to sustain a
balanced Flywheel**



Drivers for Change


The Demands on what vendors and users want from Xen Project is changing

Users

**Open Source
Development Model**

**Product and
Experience**

Development Activity



*Little scrutiny by the tech press
Mostly happy
Fairly disengaged*

*Established and stable
development model*

**2014
and before**

*Features
Performance/Scalability
Quality*

*Lower development cost
Community Growth*



*Huge amount of scrutiny by the tech press
(security, process, releases, ...)
Some users unhappy (status quo vs. change)
Vocal users and vendors (the odd "rant")*


*Community is forced to
change:*

*Training, Test Lab(s), Review vs.
Features, Security Management
Process, Security vs. Features,
Release Process, ...*

**2014, 2015,
Future ...**

*Features
Performance/Scalability
Higher Quality
Security
Usability / Integrations
More competition
(e.g. Containers, Docker, ...)*

*Lower development cost
Community Growth (not at all cost)
New Players: Security, Embedded, ...
New Regions: e.g. China & Ukraine
More aggressive product roadmaps*



Xen has a history of recent change

External factors are accelerating the amount of change

Example:

Evolution of
Xen Project Security Vulnerability Process

xenproject.org/security-policy.html



V1.0 : Modelled on Debian

Goals:


Allow **fixing, packaging and testing**;

Allow service providers **to prepare** (but not deploy) during embargo

Pre-disclosure:

Membership biased towards **distros & large service providers**

No predefined disclosure time




July 2012: [CVE-2012-0217, Intel SYSRET](#)

Affected FreeBSD, NetBSD, Solaris, Xen and Microsoft Windows

A large pre-disclosure list member put pressure on key members of the Xen Project Community to get an embargo extension

They eventually convinced the discoverer to request an extension



Community Consultation to improve our process

Centered on:

Predetermined disclosure schedule: **1 week to fix, 2 weeks embargo**

Who should be allowed on the pre-disclosure list

Fairness issues between small and large service providers

Direct vs. indirect Xen consumers

The **risk** of larger pre-disclosure list membership




V2.0 : Clarifications

Strongly recommended **disclosure schedule**

Inclusive pre-disclosure list membership

Changes to **application procedure** (based on checkable criteria)



Sept 2014: [CVE-2014-7118](#)

Leading to the first Cloud Reboot

AWS pre-announced cloud reboot to their customers

Other vendors didn't.

Policy was **interpreted differently** by vendors.

This highlighted **ambiguities** in the project's security policy
(what can/can't be said/done during an embargo)



V3.0 : Deploy & Optimizations

Goals:

Allow **fixing, packaging and testing**

Allow service providers to **prepare** (and **normally to deploy**) during embargo


Pre-disclosure:

Clearer application criteria

Public application process (transparency)

Clear information on **what is/is not allowed during an embargo** (per XSA)

Means for pre-disclosure list members to **collaborate**



May 2015: [CVE-2015-3456](#)

First time we were affected by a branded bug

QEMU bug, which was handled by **several security teams**: QEMU, OSS Distro Security, Oracle Security & Xen Project

From a process perspective: were **not able to provide a fix 2 weeks before** the embargo date ended

Conducted [XSA-133 Retrospective](#) upon request

Process change: [Earlier embargoed pre-disclosure without patches](#)