Linux stub domains: Difference between revisions
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(Add qubes-devel discussion on QMP) |
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* Jul 2018, [https://lists.gt.net/xen/devel/523881 v1 patch] |
* Jul 2018, [https://lists.gt.net/xen/devel/523881 v1 patch] |
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== Xen Summit 2019 Design Session == |
== Xen Summit 2019 Design Session == |
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=== Display architecture proposed by Brendan K === |
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* migrate from display changer on Qubes and OpenXT surfman, to upstream Xen interfaces (from EPAM) |
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+-----------------------------------------------------+ |
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* use Linux 5.1 drm-front driver for displayif |
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| +-------------------------------------------------+ | |
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* share common codebase for: EPAM, Qubes, OpenXT, Redfield |
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| | +-------+ +---------+ +---------+ +-----+ | | |
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| | |DRM DCL| | ALSA | | evdev | | qmp | | | |
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| | +-------+ +---------+ +---------+ QEmu +-----+ | | |
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| +-------------------------------------------------+ | |
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| | | | | | |
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| | | | | | |
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| +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +-----------+ | |
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| | card0 | | ALSA/PA | | evdev | |argo_stream| | |
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| +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +-----------+ | |
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+-----------------------------------------------------+ |
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| +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +------+ | |
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| | Xen DRM | | Xen Snd | | Xen KBD | Linux | Xen | | |
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| | Front | | Front | | Front | Stubdom| Argo | | |
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| +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +------+ | |
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+-----------------------------------------------------+ |
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[[File:2019-07-common-linux-stubdom.png]] |
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=== QMP discussion === |
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Proposal: |
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- LibXL and block backend: change "xenstore stuff" to "QMP stuff" |
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Concerns: |
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# QMP is not a simple protocol. |
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# xenstore-based protocol is much simpler than a JSON-encapsulated protocol. |
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# There have been multiple historical bugs in parsing of JSON in C. |
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# If we extend QMP support in LibXL and are communicating with a ''potentially compromised'' QEMU process, it would be a security regression. |
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Possible mitigations for a ''potentially compromised QEMU'' |
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# Reduce privileges given to the QEMU instance |
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# Limit interfaces to the QEMU instance |
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# Work with upstream QEMU to propose a new safer-than-JSON alternative marshalling format backend |
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# Minimize what LibXL does with QMP messages: use an off-the-shelf JSON firewall/translator/filter in the untrusted guest, limited to the QEMU subset of JSON |
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# Don't talk to QEMU after the device is started: mostly done today, but does not work for some corner cases: optical drive insert, device hotplug |
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# Have an option to intentionally break all QMP communications |
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Other notes: |
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* Qubes uses dracut for build, OpenXT uses OE |
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* For OpenXT/Qubes, many QEMU functions can build-time disabled |
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* For Debian/SuSE distro, the generic QEMU binary has many functions enabled. It may be an option to ship "minimal QEMU" and "minimal kernel" configured binaries for distro stubdoms. |
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Actions: |
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* Marek to resubmit Linux stubdom patches to xen-devel, ask people to comment on which patches have consensus or open discussion items |
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* Ian J can review patches in mid-August |
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* Upstream Xen will merge the ones which are not contended |
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* Work towards consensus on contended patches |
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== Additional Notes == |
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=== QMP in Qubes and OpenXT === |
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Connection between the qemu device model and the libxl toolstack requires a communication channel to be established between the separate domains where they are run, which is then used to deliver QMP traffic in both Qubes and OpenXT. |
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Qubes uses a vchan-socket-proxy: |
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[https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-vmm-xen-stubdom-linux/blob/master/rootfs/init#L147 https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-vmm-xen-stubdom-linux/blob/master/rootfs/init#L147] |
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[https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-vmm-xen-stubdom-linux/blob/master/helpers/vchan-socket-proxy.c https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-vmm-xen-stubdom-linux/blob/master/helpers/vchan-socket-proxy.c] |
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OpenXT uses a qemu character device that delivers via Argo to a helper process in dom0: |
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[https://github.com/OpenXT/xenclient-oe/blob/9.0.2/recipes-extended/qemu-dm/qemu-dm/qmp-argo-char-driver.patch https://github.com/OpenXT/xenclient-oe/blob/9.0.2/recipes-extended/qemu-dm/qemu-dm/qmp-argo-char-driver.patch] |
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[https://github.com/OpenXT/xctools/blob/9.0.2/qmp_helper/src/qmp_helper.c https://github.com/OpenXT/xctools/blob/9.0.2/qmp_helper/src/qmp_helper.c] |
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The Xen toolstack libxl is currently dropping QMP Events after parsing them from JSON, so filtering at the qemu source could reduce the volume of interactions over the channel: |
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[https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=blob;f=tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c;h=9aabad74fabd7bfd27b2bac153973c612a46a3c2;hb=HEAD#l278 https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=blob;f=tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c;h=9aabad74fabd7bfd27b2bac153973c612a46a3c2;hb=HEAD#l278] |
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Latest revision as of 05:09, 16 October 2019
Linux stub domains are used in QubesOS and OpenXT.
- (2018) Linux-based Device Model Stubdomains in Qubes OS, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
- (2018) Xen Security Weather Report 2018, Lars Kurth
- (2017) MSI support for PCI device pass-through with stub domains, Simon Gaiser
Upstreaming
todo: add remaining patches
00/17 Add support for qemu-xen runnning in a Linux-based stubdomain:
05/17 libxl: Handle Linux stubdomain specific QEMU options:
08/17 xl: add stubdomain related options to xl config parser
- Jul 2018, v1 patch
Interfaces between stubdom QEMU and dom0
- (June 2019) qemu-stubdom<=>dom0 interface changes
- (June 2019) Requirements for PVH stubdoms
Xen Summit 2019 Design Session
Display architecture proposed by Brendan K
- migrate from display changer on Qubes and OpenXT surfman, to upstream Xen interfaces (from EPAM)
- use Linux 5.1 drm-front driver for displayif
- share common codebase for: EPAM, Qubes, OpenXT, Redfield
QMP discussion
Proposal:
- LibXL and block backend: change "xenstore stuff" to "QMP stuff"
Concerns:
- QMP is not a simple protocol.
- xenstore-based protocol is much simpler than a JSON-encapsulated protocol.
- There have been multiple historical bugs in parsing of JSON in C.
- If we extend QMP support in LibXL and are communicating with a potentially compromised QEMU process, it would be a security regression.
Possible mitigations for a potentially compromised QEMU
- Reduce privileges given to the QEMU instance
- Limit interfaces to the QEMU instance
- Work with upstream QEMU to propose a new safer-than-JSON alternative marshalling format backend
- Minimize what LibXL does with QMP messages: use an off-the-shelf JSON firewall/translator/filter in the untrusted guest, limited to the QEMU subset of JSON
- Don't talk to QEMU after the device is started: mostly done today, but does not work for some corner cases: optical drive insert, device hotplug
- Have an option to intentionally break all QMP communications
Other notes:
- Qubes uses dracut for build, OpenXT uses OE
- For OpenXT/Qubes, many QEMU functions can build-time disabled
- For Debian/SuSE distro, the generic QEMU binary has many functions enabled. It may be an option to ship "minimal QEMU" and "minimal kernel" configured binaries for distro stubdoms.
Actions:
- Marek to resubmit Linux stubdom patches to xen-devel, ask people to comment on which patches have consensus or open discussion items
- Ian J can review patches in mid-August
- Upstream Xen will merge the ones which are not contended
- Work towards consensus on contended patches
Additional Notes
QMP in Qubes and OpenXT
Connection between the qemu device model and the libxl toolstack requires a communication channel to be established between the separate domains where they are run, which is then used to deliver QMP traffic in both Qubes and OpenXT.
Qubes uses a vchan-socket-proxy:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-vmm-xen-stubdom-linux/blob/master/rootfs/init#L147
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-vmm-xen-stubdom-linux/blob/master/helpers/vchan-socket-proxy.c
OpenXT uses a qemu character device that delivers via Argo to a helper process in dom0:
https://github.com/OpenXT/xctools/blob/9.0.2/qmp_helper/src/qmp_helper.c
The Xen toolstack libxl is currently dropping QMP Events after parsing them from JSON, so filtering at the qemu source could reduce the volume of interactions over the channel:
