Linux stub domains

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Linux stub domains are used in QubesOS and OpenXT.


todo: add remaining patches

00/17 Add support for qemu-xen runnning in a Linux-based stubdomain:

05/17 libxl: Handle Linux stubdomain specific QEMU options:

08/17 xl: add stubdomain related options to xl config parser

Interfaces between stubdom QEMU and dom0

Xen Summit 2019 Design Session

Display architecture proposed by Brendan K

  • migrate from display changer on Qubes and OpenXT surfman, to upstream Xen interfaces (from EPAM)
  • use Linux 5.1 drm-front driver for displayif
  • share common codebase for: EPAM, Qubes, OpenXT, Redfield


QMP discussion


- LibXL and block backend: change "xenstore stuff" to "QMP stuff"


  1. QMP is not a simple protocol.
  2. xenstore-based protocol is much simpler than a JSON-encapsulated protocol.
  3. There have been multiple historical bugs in parsing of JSON in C.
  4. If we extend QMP support in LibXL and are communicating with a potentially compromised QEMU process, it would be a security regression.

Possible mitigations for a potentially compromised QEMU

  1. Reduce privileges given to the QEMU instance
  2. Limit interfaces to the QEMU instance
  3. Work with upstream QEMU to propose a new safer-than-JSON alternative marshalling format backend
  4. Minimize what LibXL does with QMP messages: use an off-the-shelf JSON firewall/translator/filter in the untrusted guest, limited to the QEMU subset of JSON
  5. Don't talk to QEMU after the device is started: mostly done today, but does not work for some corner cases: optical drive insert, device hotplug
  6. Have an option to intentionally break all QMP communications

Other notes:

  • Qubes uses dracut for build, OpenXT uses OE
  • For OpenXT/Qubes, many QEMU functions can build-time disabled
  • For Debian/SuSE distro, the generic QEMU binary has many functions enabled. It may be an option to ship "minimal QEMU" and "minimal kernel" configured binaries for distro stubdoms.


  • Marek to resubmit Linux stubdom patches to xen-devel, ask people to comment on which patches have consensus or open discussion items
  • Ian J can review patches in mid-August
  • Upstream Xen will merge the ones which are not contended
  • Work towards consensus on contended patches

Additional Notes

QMP in Qubes and OpenXT

Connection between the qemu device model and the libxl toolstack requires a communication channel to be established between the separate domains where they are run, which is then used to deliver QMP traffic in both Qubes and OpenXT.

Qubes uses a vchan-socket-proxy:

OpenXT uses a qemu character device that delivers via Argo to a helper process in dom0:

The Xen toolstack libxl is currently dropping QMP Events after parsing them from JSON, so filtering at the qemu source could reduce the volume of interactions over the channel:;a=blob;f=tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c;h=9aabad74fabd7bfd27b2bac153973c612a46a3c2;hb=HEAD#l278