Live-Updating Xen: Difference between revisions
(→Current State: clarify the POC works with patches in Varad's tree.) |
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== Current State == |
== Current State == |
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=== Merged upstream === |
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* [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/utils/kernel/kexec/kexec-tools.git/log/?h=v2.0.20-rc1 kexec work merged for v2.0.20] |
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* PV domU serialization work ongoing |
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* [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/utils/kernel/kexec/kexec-tools.git/log/?h=v2.0.20 Multiboot2 support (i.e. relocation support) merged in kexec-tools v2.0.20] |
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Initial proof-of-concept with patches from Varad's tree (link below) - no kexec involved: |
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=== Posted upstream, in review === |
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Early cleanups and fixes (v1): https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2020-02/msg00000.html |
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TODO: For early `vmap()` we really want to make it officially OK to free boot-allocated pages with `free_xenheap_pages()` and even `free_domheap_pages()`. This involves fixing the esoteric corner cases in which it currently (rarely) doesn't quite work. Plan is to merge the `PGC_allocated` bit into the `PGC_state` bits, giving us 3 bits which can encode 8 states, of which 6 are currently valid: { inuse, offlining, broken_offlining, offline, broken, free }. We use the all-zeroes as 'never touched by the heap' moving inuse to 1, and then free_xenheap_pages() and free_domheap_pages() can check for that and call init_heap_pages() instead of free_heap_pages() if necessary. And we have one spare state for future use. (Varad) |
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=== Posted as RFC === |
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* Physical memory management over kexec [https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=people/dwmw2/xen.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/live-update-handover.pandoc;hb=refs/heads/lu-master Handover protocol documentation] [http://david.woodhou.se/live-update-handover.pdf Potentially out of date PDF version] |
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* Management of live update data stream passing domains' state from Running Xen to Target Xen. |
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* Definition of state record format based on migration stream record format. |
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* Reservation of domain-owned pages in Target Xen as heap allocator starts up. |
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=== In development hacks === |
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* PV domain save/restore over kexec with certain caveats. |
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<dwmw2_gone> [root@localhost ~]# xl info | grep cc_compile_date |
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<dwmw2_gone> cc_compile_date : Wed Jan 22 21:10:38 GMT 2020 |
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<dwmw2_gone> [root@localhost ~]# KEXEC_LIVE_UPATE=1 ./kexec-tools/build/sbin/kexec xen2 --append="console=vga,com1 crashkernel=128M<4G no-real-mode insert_l1d_flush=0 dom0_max_vcpus=1 liveupdate=128M@2936M:0xb7800000" --mem-min=0xaf800000 -t multiboot2-x86 -f |
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<dwmw2_gone> can't get linerar framebuffer address |
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<dwmw2_gone> kexec failed: Invalid argument |
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<dwmw2_gone> [root@localhost ~]# xl info | grep cc_compile_date |
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<dwmw2_gone> cc_compile_date : Wed Jan 22 21:45:36 GMT 2020 |
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<dwmw2_gone> Wheee. Really must fix that -EINVAL :) |
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<andyhhp> is that a kexec reload actually preserving dom0? |
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<dwmw2_gone> yep |
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<andyhhp> ship it :) |
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<dwmw2_gone> a carefully configured dom0 with 2l event channels, one vcpu |
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=== Being worked on === |
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* Pass M2P over (dwmw2) |
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* Refactor internal LU_DOMAIN_INFO record to post upstream (dwmw2) |
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* Refactor internal page list record into a single uint64_t per contiguous range of MFNs of the same time (dwmw2) |
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* Continue fixing PV Dom0 (Julien / Varad) |
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** Support more than one vCPU (Varad) |
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** FIFO event channels (Varad) |
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* Refactor internal PV save/restore (once it's all working perfectly) for posting upstream; especially all the hacks through domain creation (TBD) |
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* Save/restore HVM domains (Julien) |
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* Upstreaming Guest transparent HVM migration support (Paul) |
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* kexec-tools `--live-update` support including memory layout based on `KEXEC_RANGE_MA_LIVEUPDATE` and `liveupdate=` command line. (Varad) |
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Initial proof-of-concept with patches from Varad's tree (link below) - no kexec involved: |
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Boot xen with domkill_leakguest cmdline param. |
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Save a PV domain state, leave guest memory in the RAM: |
Save a PV domain state, leave guest memory in the RAM: |
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# xl save -s domU domU.img |
# xl save -s domU domU.img |
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== Development trees == |
== Development trees == |
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http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/xen.git/shortlog/refs/heads/bootcleanup |
* http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/xen.git/shortlog/refs/heads/bootcleanup |
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* https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=people/dwmw2/xen.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/lu-master |
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https://github.com/varadgautam/xen/tree/liveupdate-devel |
* https://github.com/varadgautam/xen/tree/liveupdate-devel |
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== TODO == |
== TODO == |
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* [https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/xensummit19/1f/20190710-xensummit-live-updating-xen.pdf Slides from Xen Summit 2019] |
* [https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/xensummit19/1f/20190710-xensummit-live-updating-xen.pdf Slides from Xen Summit 2019] |
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* Video recording of the Xen Summit 2019 talk |
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ANaDS9BUhuA&list=PLYyw7IQjL-zHmP6CuqwuqfXNK5QLmU7Ur&index=15&t=0s Video recording of the Xen Summit 2019 talk] |
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=== Design Session Notes from Xen Summit 2019 === |
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* Brief project overview: |
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** We want to build Xen Live-update |
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** early prototyping phase |
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** IDEA: change running hypervisor to new one without guest disruptions |
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** Reasons: |
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*** Security - we might need an updated versions for vuln mitigation |
|||
*** Development cycle accelaration - fast switch to hypervisor during dev |
|||
*** Maintainability - reduce version diversity in the fleet |
|||
** We are currently eyeing a combination of guest transparent live migration and kexec into a new xen buildb |
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** For more details: Live-Update talk |
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* Terminology: |
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** Running Xen -> The xen running on the host before update (Source) |
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** Target Xen -> The xen we are updating *to* |
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* Design discussions: |
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* Live-update ties into multiple other projects currently done in the Xen-project: |
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** Secret free Xen: reduce the footprint of guest relevant data in Xen |
|||
*** less state we might have to handle in the live update case |
|||
** dom0less: bootstrap domains without the involvement of dom0 |
|||
*** this might come in handy to at least setup and continue dom0 on target xen |
|||
*** If we have this this might also enable us to de-serialize the state for other guest-domains in xen and not have to wait for dom0 to do this |
|||
* We want to just keep domain and hardware state |
|||
** Xen is supposedly completely to be exchanged |
|||
** We have to keep around the IOMMU page tables and do not touch them |
|||
*** this might also come in handy for some newer UEFI boot related issues? |
|||
*** We might have to go and reinject certain interrupts |
|||
** do we need to dis-aggregate xenheap and domheap here? |
|||
*** We are currently trying to avoid this |
|||
* A key stepstone for Live-update is guest transparent live migration |
|||
** This means we are using a well defined ABI for saving/restoring domain state |
|||
*** We do only rely on domain state and no internal xen state |
|||
** The idea is to migrate the guest not from one machine to another (in space) but on the same machine from one hypervisor to another (in time) |
|||
** In addition we want to keep as much as possible in memory unchanged and feed this back to the target domain in order to save time |
|||
** This means we will need additional info on those memory areas and have to be super careful not to stomp over them while starting the target xen |
|||
** for live migration: domid is a problem in this case |
|||
*** randomize and pray does not work on smaller fleets |
|||
*** this is not a problem for live-update |
|||
*** BUT: as a community we shoudl make this restriction go away |
|||
* Exchanging the Hypervisor using kexec |
|||
** We have patches on upstream kexec-tools merged that enable multiboot2 for Xen |
|||
** We can now load the target xen binary to the crashdump region to not stomp over any valuable date we might need later |
|||
** But using the crashdump region for this has drawbacks when it comes to debugging and we might want to think about this later |
|||
*** What happens when live-update goes wrong? |
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*** Option: Increase Crashdump region size and partition it or have a separate reserved live-update region to load the target xen into |
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*** Separate region or partitoned region is not a priority for V1 but should be on the road map for future versions |
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* Who serializes and deserializes domain state? |
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** dom0: This should work fine, but who does this for dom0 itself? |
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** Xen: This will need some more work, but might covered mostly by the dom0less effort on the arm side |
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*** this will need some work for x86, but Stefano does not consider this a lot of work |
|||
** This would mean: serialize domain state into multiboot module and set domains up after kexecing xen in the dom0less manner |
|||
*** make multiboot module general enough so we can tag it as boot/resume/create/etc. |
|||
**** this will also enable us to do per-guest feature enablement |
|||
**** finer granular than specifying on cmdline |
|||
**** cmdline stuff is mostly broken, needs to be fixed for nested either way |
|||
**** domain create flags is a mess |
|||
* Live update instead of crashdump? |
|||
** Can we use such capabilities to recover from a crash be "restarting" xen on a crash? |
|||
*** live updating into (the same) xen on crash |
|||
** crashing is a good mechanism because it happens if something is really broken and most likely not recoverable |
|||
** Live update should be a concious process and not something you do as reaction to a crash |
|||
*** something is really broken if we crash |
|||
*** we should not proactively restart xen on crash |
|||
**** we might run into crash loops |
|||
** maybe this can be done in the future, but it is not changing anything for the design |
|||
*** if anybody wants to wire this up once live update is there, that should not be too hard |
|||
*** then you want to think about: scattering the domains to multiple other hosts to not keep them on broken machines |
|||
* We should use this opportunity to clean up certain parts of the code base: |
|||
** interface for domain information is a mess |
|||
*** HVM and PV have some shared data but completely different ways of accessing it |
|||
* Volume of patches: |
|||
** Live update: still developing, we do not know yet |
|||
** guest transparent live migration: |
|||
*** We have roughly 100 patches over time |
|||
*** we believe most of this has just to be cleaned up/squashed and will land us at a reasonable much lower number |
|||
*** this also needs 2-3 dom0 kernel patches |
|||
* Summary of action items: |
|||
** coordinate with dom0less effort on what we can use and contribute there |
|||
** fix the domid clash problem |
|||
** Decision on usage of crash kernel area |
|||
** fix live migration patch set to include yet unsupported backends |
|||
*** clean up the patch set |
|||
*** upstream it |
|||
* Longer term vision: |
|||
** Have a tiny hypervisor between Guest and Xen that handles the common cases |
|||
*** this enables (almost) zero downtime for the guest |
|||
*** the tiny hypervisor will maintain the guest while the underlying xen is kexecing into new build |
|||
* Somebody someday will want to get rid of the long tail of old xen versions in a fleet |
|||
** live patch old running versions with live update capability? |
|||
** crashdumping into a new hypervisor? |
|||
*** "crazy idea" but this will likely come up at some point |
Latest revision as of 16:56, 6 February 2020
Live-Updating Xen
Current State
Merged upstream
Posted upstream, in review
Early cleanups and fixes (v1): https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2020-02/msg00000.html
TODO: For early `vmap()` we really want to make it officially OK to free boot-allocated pages with `free_xenheap_pages()` and even `free_domheap_pages()`. This involves fixing the esoteric corner cases in which it currently (rarely) doesn't quite work. Plan is to merge the `PGC_allocated` bit into the `PGC_state` bits, giving us 3 bits which can encode 8 states, of which 6 are currently valid: { inuse, offlining, broken_offlining, offline, broken, free }. We use the all-zeroes as 'never touched by the heap' moving inuse to 1, and then free_xenheap_pages() and free_domheap_pages() can check for that and call init_heap_pages() instead of free_heap_pages() if necessary. And we have one spare state for future use. (Varad)
Posted as RFC
- Physical memory management over kexec Handover protocol documentation Potentially out of date PDF version
- Management of live update data stream passing domains' state from Running Xen to Target Xen.
- Definition of state record format based on migration stream record format.
- Reservation of domain-owned pages in Target Xen as heap allocator starts up.
In development hacks
- PV domain save/restore over kexec with certain caveats.
<dwmw2_gone> [root@localhost ~]# xl info | grep cc_compile_date <dwmw2_gone> cc_compile_date : Wed Jan 22 21:10:38 GMT 2020 <dwmw2_gone> [root@localhost ~]# KEXEC_LIVE_UPATE=1 ./kexec-tools/build/sbin/kexec xen2 --append="console=vga,com1 crashkernel=128M<4G no-real-mode insert_l1d_flush=0 dom0_max_vcpus=1 liveupdate=128M@2936M:0xb7800000" --mem-min=0xaf800000 -t multiboot2-x86 -f <dwmw2_gone> can't get linerar framebuffer address <dwmw2_gone> kexec failed: Invalid argument <dwmw2_gone> [root@localhost ~]# xl info | grep cc_compile_date <dwmw2_gone> cc_compile_date : Wed Jan 22 21:45:36 GMT 2020 <dwmw2_gone> Wheee. Really must fix that -EINVAL :) <andyhhp> is that a kexec reload actually preserving dom0? <dwmw2_gone> yep <andyhhp> ship it :) <dwmw2_gone> a carefully configured dom0 with 2l event channels, one vcpu
Being worked on
- Pass M2P over (dwmw2)
- Refactor internal LU_DOMAIN_INFO record to post upstream (dwmw2)
- Refactor internal page list record into a single uint64_t per contiguous range of MFNs of the same time (dwmw2)
- Continue fixing PV Dom0 (Julien / Varad)
- Support more than one vCPU (Varad)
- FIFO event channels (Varad)
- Refactor internal PV save/restore (once it's all working perfectly) for posting upstream; especially all the hacks through domain creation (TBD)
- Save/restore HVM domains (Julien)
- Upstreaming Guest transparent HVM migration support (Paul)
- kexec-tools `--live-update` support including memory layout based on `KEXEC_RANGE_MA_LIVEUPDATE` and `liveupdate=` command line. (Varad)
Initial proof-of-concept with patches from Varad's tree (link below) - no kexec involved:
Boot xen with domkill_leakguest cmdline param. Save a PV domain state, leave guest memory in the RAM: # xl save -s domU domU.img Restore domain state reusing magic mfns. The shared_info page contents are preserved: # xl restore -T domU.img <l3tab_mfn> <l2tab_mfn> <shared_info_mfn> TODO: Restore console, reconstruct guest pagetables from shared_info.
Development trees
- http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/xen.git/shortlog/refs/heads/bootcleanup
- https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=people/dwmw2/xen.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/lu-master
- https://github.com/varadgautam/xen/tree/liveupdate-devel
TODO
This list will move to the JIRA instance
- Devel milestone: PV domU persists across domain destroy/create
- Dom0 persists across kexec
- HVM guests persist across kexec
- PV guests persist across kexec
- One guest persists across kexec
- Multiple guests persist across kexec
- Guests exercise workloads
- Update to same Xen binary as the Target Xen
- Update to a Xen binary with a minor change, like a new printk
- Update to a Xen binary with a fix for an XSA
- Update to a new minor version
- Update to a new major version
More information
Design Session Notes from Xen Summit 2019
- Brief project overview:
- We want to build Xen Live-update
- early prototyping phase
- IDEA: change running hypervisor to new one without guest disruptions
- Reasons:
- Security - we might need an updated versions for vuln mitigation
- Development cycle accelaration - fast switch to hypervisor during dev
- Maintainability - reduce version diversity in the fleet
- We are currently eyeing a combination of guest transparent live migration and kexec into a new xen buildb
- For more details: Live-Update talk
- Terminology:
- Running Xen -> The xen running on the host before update (Source)
- Target Xen -> The xen we are updating *to*
- Design discussions:
- Live-update ties into multiple other projects currently done in the Xen-project:
- Secret free Xen: reduce the footprint of guest relevant data in Xen
- less state we might have to handle in the live update case
- dom0less: bootstrap domains without the involvement of dom0
- this might come in handy to at least setup and continue dom0 on target xen
- If we have this this might also enable us to de-serialize the state for other guest-domains in xen and not have to wait for dom0 to do this
- Secret free Xen: reduce the footprint of guest relevant data in Xen
- We want to just keep domain and hardware state
- Xen is supposedly completely to be exchanged
- We have to keep around the IOMMU page tables and do not touch them
- this might also come in handy for some newer UEFI boot related issues?
- We might have to go and reinject certain interrupts
- do we need to dis-aggregate xenheap and domheap here?
- We are currently trying to avoid this
- A key stepstone for Live-update is guest transparent live migration
- This means we are using a well defined ABI for saving/restoring domain state
- We do only rely on domain state and no internal xen state
- The idea is to migrate the guest not from one machine to another (in space) but on the same machine from one hypervisor to another (in time)
- In addition we want to keep as much as possible in memory unchanged and feed this back to the target domain in order to save time
- This means we will need additional info on those memory areas and have to be super careful not to stomp over them while starting the target xen
- for live migration: domid is a problem in this case
- randomize and pray does not work on smaller fleets
- this is not a problem for live-update
- BUT: as a community we shoudl make this restriction go away
- This means we are using a well defined ABI for saving/restoring domain state
- Exchanging the Hypervisor using kexec
- We have patches on upstream kexec-tools merged that enable multiboot2 for Xen
- We can now load the target xen binary to the crashdump region to not stomp over any valuable date we might need later
- But using the crashdump region for this has drawbacks when it comes to debugging and we might want to think about this later
- What happens when live-update goes wrong?
- Option: Increase Crashdump region size and partition it or have a separate reserved live-update region to load the target xen into
- Separate region or partitoned region is not a priority for V1 but should be on the road map for future versions
- Who serializes and deserializes domain state?
- dom0: This should work fine, but who does this for dom0 itself?
- Xen: This will need some more work, but might covered mostly by the dom0less effort on the arm side
- this will need some work for x86, but Stefano does not consider this a lot of work
- This would mean: serialize domain state into multiboot module and set domains up after kexecing xen in the dom0less manner
- make multiboot module general enough so we can tag it as boot/resume/create/etc.
- this will also enable us to do per-guest feature enablement
- finer granular than specifying on cmdline
- cmdline stuff is mostly broken, needs to be fixed for nested either way
- domain create flags is a mess
- make multiboot module general enough so we can tag it as boot/resume/create/etc.
- Live update instead of crashdump?
- Can we use such capabilities to recover from a crash be "restarting" xen on a crash?
- live updating into (the same) xen on crash
- crashing is a good mechanism because it happens if something is really broken and most likely not recoverable
- Live update should be a concious process and not something you do as reaction to a crash
- something is really broken if we crash
- we should not proactively restart xen on crash
- we might run into crash loops
- maybe this can be done in the future, but it is not changing anything for the design
- if anybody wants to wire this up once live update is there, that should not be too hard
- then you want to think about: scattering the domains to multiple other hosts to not keep them on broken machines
- Can we use such capabilities to recover from a crash be "restarting" xen on a crash?
- We should use this opportunity to clean up certain parts of the code base:
- interface for domain information is a mess
- HVM and PV have some shared data but completely different ways of accessing it
- interface for domain information is a mess
- Volume of patches:
- Live update: still developing, we do not know yet
- guest transparent live migration:
- We have roughly 100 patches over time
- we believe most of this has just to be cleaned up/squashed and will land us at a reasonable much lower number
- this also needs 2-3 dom0 kernel patches
- Summary of action items:
- coordinate with dom0less effort on what we can use and contribute there
- fix the domid clash problem
- Decision on usage of crash kernel area
- fix live migration patch set to include yet unsupported backends
- clean up the patch set
- upstream it
- Longer term vision:
- Have a tiny hypervisor between Guest and Xen that handles the common cases
- this enables (almost) zero downtime for the guest
- the tiny hypervisor will maintain the guest while the underlying xen is kexecing into new build
- Have a tiny hypervisor between Guest and Xen that handles the common cases
- Somebody someday will want to get rid of the long tail of old xen versions in a fleet
- live patch old running versions with live update capability?
- crashdumping into a new hypervisor?
- "crazy idea" but this will likely come up at some point