Xen in Qubes OS Security Architecture: Difference between revisions
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[https://www.qubes-os.org/attachment/wiki/QubesArchitecture/arch-spec-0.3.pdf This document] describes the architecture of [http://qubes-os.org/ Qubes OS] an open source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and utilize most of the Linux drivers. In the future it might also run Windows apps. |
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Section 3 of [ |
Section 3 of [https://www.qubes-os.org/attachment/wiki/QubesArchitecture/arch-spec-0.3.pdf this document] contains a discussion of the security of the Xen hypervisor as well as KVM. For your convenience, we outlined the content of this section here |
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3. The hypervisor and the administrative domain |
3. The hypervisor and the administrative domain |
Latest revision as of 00:12, 17 July 2018
This document describes the architecture of Qubes OS an open source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and utilize most of the Linux drivers. In the future it might also run Windows apps.
Section 3 of this document contains a discussion of the security of the Xen hypervisor as well as KVM. For your convenience, we outlined the content of this section here
3. The hypervisor and the administrative domain
- The role of the hypervisor
- Xen vs. KVM security architecture comparison
- The thin vs. fat hypervisor argument
- The I/O Emulation vs. PV drivers
- Driver domains support
- Summary
- Securing the hypervisor
- Formal security proofs?
- Reducing hypervisor footprint
- Anti-exploitation mechanisms in the hypervisor
- Reducing Inter-VM covert channels
- The administrative domain (Dom0)
- Power management and ACPI support
- ACPI security concerns
- Preventing ACPI abusing attacks