Category:Safety Certification: Difference between revisions
From Xen
Jump to navigationJump to search
Lars.kurth (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
Lars.kurth (talk | contribs) |
||
Line 25: | Line 25: | ||
* '''The AGL software defined connected car architecture''', April 2018: [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1HpYzClh0nDEocsUHb17X0DxiehsAbCgyWE-P2Wk_RNU/edit# whitepaper] |
* '''The AGL software defined connected car architecture''', April 2018: [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1HpYzClh0nDEocsUHb17X0DxiehsAbCgyWE-P2Wk_RNU/edit# whitepaper] |
||
* '''TSC Sponsored BoF: Can Linux and Automotive Functional Safety Mix ? Take 2: Towards an open source, industry acceptable high assurance OS''', Robin Randhawa, 2017: [https://www.slideshare.net/linaroorg/tsc-sponsored-bof-can-linux-and-automotive-functional-safety-mix-take-2-towards-an-open-source-industry-acceptable-high-assurance-os-sfo17218 slides] |
* '''TSC Sponsored BoF: Can Linux and Automotive Functional Safety Mix ? Take 2: Towards an open source, industry acceptable high assurance OS''', Robin Randhawa, 2017: [https://www.slideshare.net/linaroorg/tsc-sponsored-bof-can-linux-and-automotive-functional-safety-mix-take-2-towards-an-open-source-industry-acceptable-high-assurance-os-sfo17218 slides] |
||
== Automotive Requirements == |
|||
Automotive functions requirements for virtualized ECUs (copied from the [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1HpYzClh0nDEocsUHb17X0DxiehsAbCgyWE-P2Wk_RNU/edit# AGL whitepaper]) |
|||
{{TODOLeft|It would be good, if we could map these to specific Xen Features, such that we see where there are gaps.}} |
|||
=== Computing === |
|||
* C1: Static resource partitioning and flexible on-demand resource allocation (CPU, RAM, GPU and IO). |
|||
* C2: Memory/IO bus bandwidth allocation and rebalancing. |
|||
=== Peripherals sharing === |
|||
* P1: GPU and displays shall be shared between execution environments supporting both fixed (each one talks to its own display or to a specified area on a single display) and flexible configurations (shape, z-order, position and assignment of surfaces from different execution environments may change at run time). |
|||
* P2: Inputs shall be routed to one or multiple execution environments depending on current mode, display configuration (for touchscreens), active application (for jog dials & buttons), etc. |
|||
* P3: Audio shall be shared between execution environments. Sound complex mixing policies for multiple audio streams and routing of dynamic source/sink devices (BT profiles, USB speakers/microphones, etc.) shall be supported. |
|||
* P4: Network shall be shared between execution environments. Virtual networks with different security characteristics shall be supported (e.g., traffic filtering and security mechanisms). |
|||
* P5: Storage shall support static or shared allocation, together with routing of dynamic storage devices (USB mass storage). |
|||
=== Security === |
|||
* SE1: Root of Trust and Secure boot shall be supported for all execution environments. |
|||
* SE2: Trusted Computing (discrete TPM, Arm TrustZone or similar) shall be available and configurable for all execution environments. |
|||
* SE3: Hardware isolation shall be supported (cache, interrupts, IOMMUs, firewalls, etc.). |
|||
* SE4: Secure updates shall be supported. |
|||
=== Performance and Power consumption === |
|||
* PP1: Virtualization performance overhead shall be minimal: 1-2% on CPU/memory benchmarks, up to 5% on GPU benchmarks. |
|||
* PP2: Predictability shall be guaranteed. Minimal performance requirements shall be met in any condition (unexpected events, system overload, etc.). |
|||
* PP3: Execution environments fast boot: Less than 2 seconds for safety critical applications, less than 5 seconds for Instrument Cluster, and 10 seconds for IVI. Hibernate and Suspend to RAM shall be supported. |
|||
* PP4: Execution environments startup order shall be predictable. |
|||
* PP5: Advanced power management shall be implemented with flexible policies for each execution environment. |
|||
=== Safety === |
|||
* SA1: System monitoring shall be supported to attest and verify that the system is correctly running. |
|||
* SA2: Restart shall be possible for each execution environment in case of failure. |
|||
* SA3: Redundancy shall be supported for the highest level of fault tolerance with fallback solutions available to react in case of failure. |
|||
* SA4: Real time support shall be guaranteed together with predictive reaction time. |
|||
== Functional Safety Requirements == |
== Functional Safety Requirements == |
Revision as of 01:15, 15 May 2019
This page links to documents, public discussions, meetings, etc. related to Safety Certification of Xen Project based products or code-lines.
At this stage this category is primarily a place where to track various activities and also to see who is interested in certification efforts of Xen and who could perform which role. |
Industry Groups having a stake in certifying Open Source Stacks
- Automotive Grade Linux Virtualization Expert Group
- Members with Xen based products: GlobalLogic (bronze), StarLab (bronze)
- Members which indirectly support/have supported Xen in this context: Renesas (platinum), Arm (gold)
- Members which have showed up at Xen channels more than once: ADIT (bronze), Harman (bronze), LG (bronze)
- Members which are also Advisory Board members: Amazon (silver), Qualcomm(silver), Oracle (bronze)
- Members with Xen based products: EPAM (2nd tier), GlobalLogic (2nd tier)
- Members which indirectly support/have supported Xen in this context: Renesas (silicon), Arm (silicon)
- Members which have showed up at Xen channels more than once: Bosch (1st), Harman (1st), LG (1st)
- Members which are also Advisory Board members: Intel (silicon), Qualcomm(silicon)
- Linaro: I am not sure whether there is a Linaro group yet, if so it would be worth adding it here
Relevant Presentations and Papers
Xen Specific
- Summary Table Comparing Different Hypervisors (March 2018)
- Xen and the Art of Certification - Nathan Studer, DornerWorks, 2014: video, slides
Industry Wide
- The AGL software defined connected car architecture, April 2018: whitepaper
- TSC Sponsored BoF: Can Linux and Automotive Functional Safety Mix ? Take 2: Towards an open source, industry acceptable high assurance OS, Robin Randhawa, 2017: slides
Functional Safety Requirements
Safety Certification
To Do:
I left this out for now, but Safety Certification Challenges provides some initial pointers to groups of information. |
Code Size impacting the cost of Safety Certification
Products using Xen and OpenEmbedded that need/have a degree of Safety Certification
Products with a degree of Safety Certification
Automotive Products
Embedded/Other Products
Contributor Spotlights
Pages in category "Safety Certification"
The following 12 pages are in this category, out of 12 total.